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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






REGIS INSURANCE COMPANY, 




 A.M. BEST COMPANY, INC.  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                      
District Court No. 2-10-cv-03171 
District Judge: The Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 16, 2015 
 
Before: SMITH, JORDAN, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  April 8, 2015)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 




 A.M. Best (“Best”) is a rating agency that specializes in rating the financial 
health of insurance companies.  On January 12, 2010, Best issued a press release 
regarding Regis Insurance (“Regis”), which is the basis of Regis’ defamation and 
commercial disparagement claims against Best.  The press release began:  
A.M. Best Co. has downgraded the financial strength rating to B- 
(Fair) from B+ (Good) and issuer credit rating to “bb-”from “bbb-” 
of Regis Insurance Company (Regis) (Wayne, PA). The outlook for 
both ratings has been revised to negative from stable. 
 
These rating actions reflect the recent disclosure of the lack of 
financial flexibility at Regis’ privately held parent, Tiber Holding 
Corporation (Wilmington, DE), due to that organization’s high 
consolidated financial leverage, lack of access to additional capital 
and other operating issues.1 
  
 In November 2009, as part of its annual rating process, Best met with Regis 
to discuss Regis’ financial health.  At that meeting, Best requested the financial 
statements of Regis’ parent, Tiber Holding (“Tiber”), which Regis promptly 
provided.  Best’s published rating methodology considers the financial condition of 
parent corporations to be potentially relevant.  Although Best claims it had 
previously requested Tiber’s financial statements, it is undisputed that it had not 
received them.  In reviewing Tiber’s financial statements, Best learned that Tiber’s 
liabilities exceeded its assets by a factor of 3.5, and that it had a negative net worth 
                                                 
 1 Regis also argued that other statements made later in the press release, 
which did not specifically relate to Tiber, were defamatory.  As these statements 
were not meaningfully discussed in the District Court’s opinion from which Regis 
appeals, or in Regis’ brief, they do not provide a potential basis for reversal. 
3 
 
of nearly $45 million.  The primary reason was that Tiber owed the Superintendent 
of Insurance of New York, in its capacity as Liquidator of Nassau Insurance 
(“Nassau”),2 nearly $43 million.  The $43 million was split between two 
judgments, with final judgment dates (according to the financial statements) of 
August 2000 and May 2002; both of which had been accumulating interest.3 
 After multiple levels of internal review at Best, including an appeal by 
Regis, and conversations between Best and the Pennsylvania Department of 
Insurance (initiated at Regis’ request), a senior rating committee at Best decided to 
downgrade Regis over “concern[] about [the] uncertainty” surrounding Tiber’s 
financial situation.  In fact, given that Tiber was insolvent, guidelines in Best’s 
                                                 
 2 “Through a subsidiary, Tiber owned Nassau . . . until Nassau was ordered 
into receivership.”  Levin v. Tiber Holding Corp., No. 98-8643, 2000 WL 
33911225, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000), vacated, 277 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 2002).   
 3 The fallout of the collapse of Nassau has been before this Court twice, with 
both Richard and Jeanne DiLoreto filing unsuccessful appeals.   The DiLoreto 
couple have owned and controlled Regis, Tiber, Nassau, and a dizzying array of 
related, largely sham entities.  See, e.g., Levin v. Tiber Holding Corp., 277 F.3d 
243, 248 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[Richard] DiLoreto admitted, under cross-examination, 
that he was unaware whether . . . bonds [passed between entities he owned, in an 
attempt to circumvent a consent decree] . . . were real”).  Our prior decisions are In 
re DiLoreto, 266 F. App’x 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2008) (Richard’s “failure to disclose 
his . . . beneficial interests in various corporations and offshore entities, as well as 
his false testimony . . . is sufficient evidence to support the denial of his discharge 
[of debt in bankruptcy]”); and Di Loreto v. Costigan, 351 F. App’x 747 (3d Cir. 
2009) (affirming dismissal of Jeanne’s claims that the Superintendent of Insurance 
of New York’s efforts to enforce judgments against her resulted in a violation of 




published methodology suggested that Regis should perhaps have been 
downgraded all the way to a C or a C+ rating (a significantly more severe 
downgrade than Regis actually received). 
 However, the District Court denied Best’s motion for summary judgment, 
stating: 
The Court finds that, without providing additional information, 
analysis, and context, it was misleading for Best to suggest that there 
had been a “recent disclosure of the lack of financial flexibility at 
Regis’ privately held parent, Tiber Holding Corporation.” Best’s use 
of the term “recent” implies that something vague and unspecified had 
happened at Tiber in the last year to render it financially inflexible, 
and thereby putting Regis at risk. But in reality, Tiber had been 
insolvent for almost ten years at the time Best published its press 
release. News of Tiber’s financial condition was only “recent” in the 
sense that Best had recently learned of it. There is a marked and 
appreciable difference between implying that Regis’ parent company 
is experiencing recent financial difficulties and clearly stating that 
Regis has been operating for almost ten years despite its parent 
company’s financial difficulties (and that Best is only now learning of 
it). 
 
Regis Ins. Co. v. A.M. Best Co., Inc., No. 10-3171, 2013 WL 775521, at *8 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 1, 2013) (footnote omitted). 
 The District Court concluded that the press release “implie[d] that something 
vague and unspecified had happened at Tiber in the last year” by not considering 
the fact that the press release specified what that “something” was:  the “recent 
disclosure of the lack of financial flexibility.”  The phrasing of the press release 
does not imply that Tiber’s lack of financial flexibility was itself recent, and 
5 
 
indeed, to the extent that it implies anything other than what it literally says, it 
implies that the lack of financial flexibility was not recent.4  Moreover, prior to 
publishing the press release, Best twice showed Regis draft press releases 
containing the identical “recent disclosure of the lack of financial flexibility” 
language of which it now complains.  Although Regis responded by disputing the 
merits of the downgrade and threatening to sue over the downgrade, Regis never 
took issue with any of the specific language used in the press release. 
 After allowing Regis to proceed to trial and present its case for six days, the 
District Court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Best.  The District 
Court concluded that Regis did not introduce sufficient evidence to allow a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Best acted with “actual malice” in issuing the 
press release.  The District Court then denied Regis’ request for a new trial.  Regis 
Ins. Co. v. A.M. Best Co., Inc., No. 10-3171, 2014 WL 2094199, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
May 20, 2014).  Regis now appeals.5 
                                                 
 4 Why else would the press release specify that there was a “recent 
disclosure of the lack of financial flexibility,” as opposed to simply stating that 
there was a “recent lack of financial flexibility?”   
 5 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); 
we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We exercise plenary 
review of the District Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law,” LaVerdure v. 
Cnty. of Montgomery, 324 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2003), and review “a motion for 
a new trial [for] abuse of discretion, except where a district court bases its denial of 
the motion on an application of law, in which case an appellate court’s review is 
plenary.”  McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 460 (3d Cir. 2009). 
6 
 
 As there is no dispute that the literal words of the press release were true, 
Regis pursues a theory of defamation by implication or innuendo.  “It is the duty of 
the court in all cases to determine whether the language used in the objectionable 
article could fairly and reasonably be construed to have the meaning imputed in the 
innuendo.  If the words are not susceptible of the meaning ascribed to them by the 
plaintiff, and do not sustain the innuendo, the case should not be sent to a jury.”  
McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Pub. Co., 72 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 1950).  On 
appeal, Regis makes no attempt whatsoever to defend the District Court’s 
reasoning that the use of the word “recent” was misleading—instead it simply 
argues that “[t]he issue of falsity should have been submitted to the jury because 
the trial court had already determined that the statements in the Press Release were 
capable of a defamatory meaning at the summary judgment stage.”  As the words 
in the press release cannot be properly construed to suggest that the “lack of 
financial flexibility” was itself “recent,” Regis was not and is not entitled to have 
its claim considered by a jury.6 
 We will affirm the District Court’s denial of Regis’ motion for a new trial. 
                                                 
 6 See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 434 (3d Cir. 2013) (under 
Pennsylvania law, “[w]hether a communication is capable of defamatory meaning 
is a ‘threshold issue’ to be determined by the court”); see also Gray v. St. Martin’s 
Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 250 (1st Cir. 2000) (appellate courts exercise de novo 
review of whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning). 
